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(4th Cir. (N.C.) June 21, 1988)
(Westlaw, SCT library)
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that McDowell
was denied due process of law at his trial by the nondisclosure
of certain exculpatory evidence held by the prosecution and not
discoverable by the defendant. Judgment of the district court
was reversed with instructions to issue the writ of habeas cor-
pus, unless petitioner be tried anew within such reasonable
period as the district court may fix. Reversed and Remanded.
FACTS
Petitioner, Robert Henry McDowell, was tried and convicted
of first degree murder and felonious assault in the Superior
Court of Johnston County, North Carolina in 1979. Petitioner
was sentenced to death on the first degree murder conviction
and twenty years in prison for the assault conviction.
Sometime after the trial, information came to petitioner's at-
torneys that the prosecution was in possession of certain ex-
culpatory evidence that had not been disclosed to the defendant,
despite a general request for discovery prior to trial. Petitioner
claimed that the prosecution violated the principles set out in
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In Brady, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the defendant is entitled, upon a
general request for discovery, to all exculpatory material per-
taining to guilt or punishment which may be in the possession
of the prosecution. The exculpatory evidence the court found to
have been wrongfully withheld in McDowell went to the
credibility of one of the victims and other witnesses. Statements
made to the police on the night of the incident contained incon-
sistencies, which could have been used to impeach the prosecu-
tion witness.
The second issue petitioner raised went to a jury instruction
which was given and alleged to be in violation of a recent U.S.
Supreme Court ruling on burden-shifting instructions. Francis v.
Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985).
The court did not address this issue since the court found the
first claim meritorious.
CASE HISTORY
Petitioner pursued postconviction remedies and was granted
a new trial by the trial court. The state appealed and the North
Carolina Supreme Court vacated the trial court's order and on
remand the trial court denied any further relief. State v.
McDowell, 310 S.E.2d 301 (1984). The Supreme Court of North
Carolina declined to review the case. A petition for writ of cer-
tiorari was denied by the U.S. Supreme Court. McDowell v.
North Carolina, - U.S. -, 90 L.Ed.2d 732 (1986).
Petitioner then filed for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal
district court, which was denied. Petitioner appealed to the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals which reversed the district
court.
HOLDINGS
The court reviewed the Brady doctrine stating that "the sup-
pression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or
bad faith of the prosecution." The rationale of the rule is not
to punish the prosecutor for misconduct but rather to insure the
accused is not denied a fair trial.
The Brady doctrine, as later restated in United States V.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), applies in four situations: 1) where
the undisclosed evidence demonstrates that the prosecution's
case includes perjured testimony, 2) when there has been sup-
pression of specific evidence described in a pretrial request, 3)
where the defense makes no pretrial request for exculpatory
evidence, or 4) where, lacking specific knowledge of what to re-
quest, defense only makes a general request for exculpatory
material. In a more recent case, State v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667
(1985), the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier holding
that Brady material included impeachment evidence.
As explained below, the effect of Brady violations is assess-
ed by reference to the importance of the evidence not disclosed.
Nevertheless, courts are naturally sympathetic to the plight of a
prosecutor who must sift through his files with only case law as
a guide to his duty to disclose. Brady violations are as a prac-
tical matter easier, to establish when requested as specifically as
possible. Indeed, there is a greater risk that evidence withheld
will never be subject to measurement by the Brady standard if
only a general request has been made.
The test for judging whether a Brady violation is harmless
error is to look at the quality of the evidence withheld and
whether there is a reasonable probability that the outcome
would have been different if the evidence had been available.
Thus, in a situation where the withheld evidence would create a
reasonable doubt, a constitutional error has been committed
and the conviction or punishment cannot stand.
In McDowell the court held that "McDowell was denied due
process of law in his trial by the nondisclosure of evidence."
Judgment of the district court was reversed with instructions to
issue the writ of habeas corpus, and award a new trial.
APPLICATION TO VIRGINIA
Virginia circuit courts have inherent authority to order
discovery beyond that delineated in Rule 3A:11. Due process re-
quirements in death penalty cases may require exercise of that
authority. In any event discovery motions should include federal
law, including Brady, as grounds and should be as specific as
possible. (Elizabeth P. Murtagh)
